DOW-UAP-D110, AAWSAP Statement of Objectives, July 2008
This document is an administrative or programmatic record related to the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP), a Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-administered program active from 2008 to 2012. AAWSAP’s official scope of work identified 12 technical research areas relating to potential aerospace threats over a time horizon of more than 40 years. As an administrative record, the file documents how AAWSAP was scoped, organized, tasked, funded, or described at a particular point in time. This July 2008 Statement of Objectives defines AAWSAP as a contractor-supported research effort intended to assess far-term foreign aerospace threats by understanding the physics and engineering of possible breakthrough technologies out to the year 2050 rather than extrapolating from then-current aerospace trends. It identifies 12 technical study areas, including lift, propulsion, control, power generation, spatial or temporal translation, materials, configuration and structure, signature reduction, human interface, human effects, armament, and related supporting topics. The document also sets out the program’s expected work structure, requiring monthly status reports, technical-area program management plans within 60 days, comprehensive research reports and briefings by the tenth month, and a final integrated threat assessment.
The summary above is sourced from the released file metadata as published to war.gov. The analysis sections below are original to this tracker.
Text of the document
Machine-extracted from the PDF war.gov published (its text layer or OCR), so expect errors, especially in names, numbers and handwriting; the PDF is the authoritative copy. Lines that did not extract as readable text are left out. Showing about 995 words from pages 1, 2, 3 of 4.
PAGE 1
STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE ADVA NC ED AEROSPACE WEAPON SY~'TEM APPLICATIONS PROGRAM 1. BACKGROUND: The Acquisition Support Division (DWO-3) of the Defonse Intelligence Agency (DIA) has the responsibility to provide guidance and oversight to the Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition process along with leveraging the DoD Intelligence Community to coordinate, produce and maintain projections of the future threat environment in which U.S. air, naval, ground, space, missile defense and infonnat:ion systems operate. In order to accurately assess the foreign threat to U.S. weapon systems, a complete as possible understanding ofpotential breakthrough technology applications employed in future aerospace weapon systems must be 2. OBJECTIVE: One aspect of the future threat environment involves advanced aerospace weapon system applications. The objective of this program is to understand the physics and engineering of these applications as they apply to the foreign threat out to the far term, i.e., from now through the year 2050. Primary focus is on breakthrough technologies and applications that create discontinuities in currently evolving technology trends. The focus is not on extrapolations of current aerospace technology. The proposal shall describe a technical approach which discusses how the breakthrough technologies and applications listed below would be studied and include proposed key personnel that have experience in those areas. a) The contractor shall e-0mplete advanced aerospace weapon system technical studies in the following areas: 4. power generation 7. configuration, structure 8. signature reduction (optical, infrared, radiofrequency, acoustic) 9. human interface I0. human effects 12. other peripheral area,:; in support of(1-11)
PAGE 2
h) It is expected that numerous experts with extensive experience (minimum of 10 years) in breakthrough aerospace research and development will be required to meet the demands of the above program. The offeror should clearly identify their approach to obtaining the services of and their utilization of these scientific and technical experts. Management personnel must include a lead integrator to oversee the work ofthe various analytical teams, and to integrate their findings into final coherent product~. At least one member of each analytical team must have a PhD, although that member c.an be on several teams. A technical plan for conducting the advanced aerospace weapon system studies described above must be included in the offeror's proposal. (c) Offeror must be able to produce integrated finished assessments in each of the above advanced aerospace weapon system technical areas. Finished reports and presentations, while highly analytical and technical, must be in a format suitable for dissemination at the highest levels of the federal government. fn addition to the main technical section of each assessment, an executive summary utilizing clearly understandable (non-technical) language must also be contained in each report. (d) To assess relevant experience, offerers shall submit at least three (3) references, including a POC name and phone number, vvith a brief description of the business relationship with the Government or other corporations. In addition, offerors should provide examples, conducted within the past 7 years, of having performed, as a prime contractor, the analysis. design, construction, and flight testing of high performance aircraft and/or satellites. Success in this program is dependent upon this capability and experience. 4. PLACE OF PERFORMA'.'ICE: The work under this contract shall be performed at the Contractor's facility. 5. SECURITY REQUIREMENT: Contractor company and personnel proposed shall be clcarablc and able to obtain a security and facility clearance upon award of the contract. All requirements specified in this SOO may be based on materials classified at or below Top Secret \\1th access to Sensitive Compartmented Infonnation (TS/ SCI). The contractor shall comply with the tenns and conditions ofthe DD-254 BEFORE initiating any classified effort. The contractor shall notify the COR and Contracting Officer immediately upon the detennination that higher classification requirements exist in order to accomplish the specified requirements. The contractor shall ensure that each individual ac.signed to this contract shall be identified, cleared, and approved through DIA/DAC-3 PRIOR to granting that individual access to, or authority to generate classified infonnation in association with this effort. 5.1. Contractor shall provide a work facility (including unclassified information systems) with a Top Secret Facility Clearance granted by the Defense Security Service (DSS). Cleared facilities are not required at contract inception. Offoror must provide personnel eligible for a Top Secret clearance level with fo.rther eligibility for SCI access. At least n.vo personnel cleared at the Secret level are required at contract inception. 6. GOVERNMENT FURNISHF:O PROPERTY/ EQUIPMENT: The Government will provide the contractor access to computers and peripherals such as printers as the Government deems necessary to access and produce classified infonnation. These computers and peripherals remain the property of the Government.
PAGE 3
7. GOVER."lMENT FURNISHED INFORMATION/DATA: Data required by the contractor to fulfill the tenns of this contract shall be requested from the Government Project Lead ( GPL) . A good faith effort will be made to fulfill any legitimate request (as assessed by the GPL), however, the responsibility to collect information and data necessary for the conduct of this etfort remains with the contractor. Any classified data provided by the Government in support of this contract will remain the property of the Government and will be returned to the government not more than 30 days after contract conclusion. 8. CONTRACTOR ACQUIRED/ GOVERNMENT OWNED PROPERTY: Any accountable property acquired by the contractor with government funds during the execution of this contract shall hecome government owned property. The contractor shall obtain ""-Titten permission from the CO or Contracting Officer Representative (COR) prior to any purchase of real property with government funds. The contractor shall establish and maintain an inventory ofall such property. This property must he inventoried and returned to the government not more than 60 days after the end of the contract. 9. RQl'IPMENT LEASE OR PURCHASE: The purchase of equipment is preferred, however, it may be more advantageous to the government to lease in certain circumstances. When it is contemplated a lease would be more advantageous to the government, contractor shall furnish the following information to the COR so the government can determine the best solution:
Where this file fits in the PURSUE archive
This file is one of DoD's 282 files in the Trump PURSUE disclosure. Within the DoD agency block it ranks #226 of 282 by Anomalousness Index. Across the entire 478-file archive it ranks #401 of 478.
That places it in the lower-scoring band of the archive (401 of 478 by score), typical of investigative-record style files where the report is paper-based rather than instrumented.
Anomalousness Index: 53/100
This is a reference document, not an encounter report, so the index has no encounter to measure here. The value above is the rubric's default for a document that describes no event, shown so every file in the archive can be ranked the same way. Not a probability of extraterrestrial origin - that number is not honestly computable from the released files and this tracker refuses to publish it.
🤖 AI-ASSISTED SCORING · methodology
The six rubric components break down for this file as follows. Each component has a weighted contribution to the final score; the per-component explanation below describes what this file's particular value on that component means in the rubric's framework.
This file is a reference document, not an observation, so no sensor, camera, or witness captured anything. The rubric's sensor axis has no not-applicable option, so a document with no instrument record sits on its lowest tier by default.
There is no witness: this is a document released by the Department of War, not a first-hand account. The rubric assigns this axis from the originating body, so the value reflects the source of the record, not anyone's testimony.
Nothing is being corroborated, because the file does not report an event. Like every file in the archive it takes the rubric's single-source default.
The file describes no object and no motion, so the kinematic axis takes the archive-wide 'no kinematic data' default.
Every file in the archive scores this tier. For a document that describes no event it carries no information about the record at all.
The rubric's default for the file's release status (files released with redactions are catalogued as unresolved, unredacted ones as open). For a document that reports no event this describes how the file was released, not anything that happened.
Bottom line on the score: the 53/100 is the rubric's default for a document that reports no encounter, so it is not a finding about any event and should not be compared with the scores of sighting reports. For the full per-axis weights and the rubric JSON, see /methodology.
Related files in DoD
Other PURSUE files in the same category, ranked by Anomalousness Index.
DOW-UAP-PR024, Unresolved UAP Report, Middle East, 2023
DOW-UAP-PR072, "ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION: IIR 1777 J0032 22 Kazakhstan - UAP in the vicinit…
DOW-UAP-PR106, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2020
DOW-UAP-PR108, Unresolved UAP Report, Western United States, 2020
DOW-UAP-PR109, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2015
DOW-UAP-PR110, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2020
Verification
SHA-256:
This hash is the SHA-256 of the file body war.gov served on the verification date above. War.gov has re-processed some file bodies since first release (re-compression + OCR, no content removed - see /changes); we re-verify and record the change rather than silently serve a stale hash. How to check this yourself →