DOW-UAP-D120, AAWSAP DIRD, Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms, January 2010

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Agency
DoD
Category
military
Type
PDF
Event Date
1/12/2010
Size
41.2 MB
Original Filename
DOW-UAP-D120_AAWSAP-DIRD-Materials-for-Advanced-Aerospace-Platforms-January-12-2010.pdf
Location
Las Vegas, Nevada
Status
REDACTED

This document is a Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRD), a technical reference format used by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to capture baseline knowledge on a specific topic for later analytic use. DIRDs are best understood as reference and synthesis products rather than as original research. It is one of 38 DIRDs produced under the Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications Program (AAWSAP) between 2009 and 2011. Because AAWSAP’s scope permitted a broad range of supporting topics, not every DIRD in the series directly concerns aerospace systems or future threat assessment. The following summary reflects the DIRD’s scope and framing at the time of writing and should not be read as implying current validation of the concepts discussed. This DIRD surveys the structural materials needed for advanced aerospace platforms and argues that material choice cannot be separated from overall vehicle design, because launch vehicles, space vehicles, reusable systems, and propulsion hardware each face different temperature, durability, weight, and manufacturing constraints. The report reviews a range of candidate material classes, including advanced aluminum alloys; polymer-, aluminum-, and titanium-matrix composites; titanium alloys; nickel-base alloys; refractory metals; ceramic-matrix composites; carbon-carbon composites; and titanium aluminides. It emphasizes that balancing performance against practical limits such as fabrication methods, cost, inspection, contamination control, and service environment remains a major challenge. Its overall conclusion is that many promising materials exist, but their usefulness depends on application-specific tradeoffs and on closer integration of material selection with design and manufacturing, with some systems judged to be more valuable targets for development than others.

The summary above is sourced from the released file metadata as published to war.gov. The analysis sections below are original to this tracker.

Text of the document

Machine-extracted from the PDF war.gov published (its text layer or OCR), so expect errors, especially in names, numbers and handwriting; the PDF is the authoritative copy. Lines that did not extract as readable text are left out. Showing about 995 words from pages 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 of 27.

PAGE 2

UNCLASSIFIED/ /Pel\ OPPICIAL USE ONLY Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms Prepared by: Acquisition Support Division (DW0-3) Defense warning Office Directorate for Analysis Defense Intelligence Agency AAP Person 66 Administrative Note COPYRIGHT WARNING: Further dissemination of the photographs in this publication is not authorized. This product is one in a series of advanced technology reports produced in FY 2009 under the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Warning Office's Advanced Aerospace Weapon System Applications (AAWSA Program. Comments or questions pertaining to this document should be addressed to MP Person 1 AAWSA Program Manager, Defense Intelligence Agency, ATTN: CLAR/DW0-3, Bldg 6000, Washington,

PAGE 3

Reusable Crew Modules...................................................................................... 9 Reusable Single-Stage-to-Orbit Vehicles ...................................................... 10 Advanced Al Alloys ....................................................................................... 11 Polymer Matrix Composites.......................................................................... 11 Al Matrix Composites.................................................................................... 12 Ti Matrix Composites.................................................................................... 14 Refractory Metal Alloys ................................................................................ 18 Ceramic Matrix Composites .......................................................................... 18 Propulsion Systems.......................................................................................... 21 Summary and Recommendations ..................................................................... 22 1. Schematic Diagram of Friction Stir Welding ....................................................... 2 2. Specially Modified 747 Transporter Unloading a Boeing 787 Composite Fuselage Barrel Section ..................................................................................... 4 3. Micrograph Showing Phase Formation at the Surface of a Ti Alloy That has Been Exposed to Air at Elevated Temperature ................................................. 13 4. Cross-Section Micrograph of a Ti Matrix Composite.......................................... 15 1. Potential Materials by Use Temperature Regime and Property ......................... 10 2. Example of Properties of Ti Matrix Composites ................................................ 14

PAGE 4

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms "Advanced aerospace platforms" is a broad topic that can be divided into several narrower subtopics to enable a more concise discussion of materials advances, challenges, and opportunities. Consequently, this document discusses the areas of launch vehicles, space vehicles, and space propulsion systems separately because their key requirements are often application specific, which affects materials selection decisions. In addition, single-use and reusable boosters have different durability requirements that directly impinge on design and materials selection. Furthermore, current engineering practice has evolved to the point that design synthesis must integrate the structure and construction materials to achieve optimum product performance. For example, the space shuttle was designed to meet customer-imposed mission requirements (range, payload, empty weight, landing capability, and so forth) without significant real-time consideration of materials capability. This approach led to significant compromises at later stages in the shuttle's development and maturation. (Arguably, the shuttle could be designed as a more efficient vehicle today.) In the extreme, a spectacular engineering failure was the National Aerospace Plane (also dubbed the Orient Express), which was launched as a military project and was intended to be a mach 12 reusable strike vehicle. This project rapidly became materials limited and was canceled in 1993, after about $750 million in federal R&D expenditures and a substantial private sector investment. The point is that any "clean sheet of paper design" must start with an assessment of the requirements for construction materials and be accompanied by a realistic assessment of the capability of currently available materials to meet these needs. If these two assessments indicate a gap between requirements and existing materials capability, a risk assessment and a risk-mitigation plan must be developed before expending engineering hours and funds. Since the inception of manned space flight, the approach to design has changed to include the concept of damage tolerance. This shift in design philosophy was prompted by the (eventual) recognition that complex structures cannot be designed and produced with zero defects. With the maturation of fracture mechanics and means of reducing these concepts to practice, the transition from zero defects to defect tolerance became the norm. This new approach in turn led to recognition that high-performance materials required not only high specific strength and stiffness but pacing increases in strength with simultaneous improvements in fracture toughness and fatigue crack growth resistance. The introduction of damage tolerance was accompanied by a renewed emphasis on nondestructive inspection capabilities. This latter thrust was driven by the need to demonstrate the capability to reproducibly locate small flaws that could become failure initiation sites, either because of static or because of cyclic loading conditions. In the case of atmospheric flight, the U.S. Air Force has introduced standards for airframes (the Aircraft Structural Integrity Program) and propulsion systems (the Engine Structural Integrity Program) that tie structural life and reliability to

PAGE 5

this demonstrated inspections capability. Implementation of these standards, starting with the B-1 bomber and the F-100 and F-110 engines, has dramatically reduced (but not eliminated) the incidence of catastrophic failures of critical components that endanger crews, vehicles, or both. Taking these changes into account, this document outlines the current situation regarding the design and production of high-performance structures for aerospace platforms, including launch vehicles, space vehicles, and propulsion systems for transporting space vehicles (and payloads) into orbit.

PAGE 6

Materials for Advanced Aerospace Platforms LAUNCH VEHICLES For the purposes of this document, launch vehicles are defined as the structure that supports and/or encloses the propulsion system, the fuel supply, and the crew or payload module. Launch vehicles today are either single use or multiple use after recovery and extensive refurbishment. This approach adds considerably to the cost of transporting a pound of payload into earth orbit, regardless of whether an unmanned satellite or a manned orbiting crew module that must withstand the temperatures and loads associated with safe reentry to earth. Furthermore, the larger the payloads are, the greater are the reaction forces the launch vehicle must withstand during launch. With the total weight of the payload, the empty weight of the launch vehicle, and fuel all needing to be lifted initially, fuel-efficient propulsion and lightweight launch vehicles are essential to maximizing the payload. Except in the area around the propulsion system exhaust, the temperatures experienced by launch vehicles during launch are not demanding. Therefore, advanced, high-strength aluminum (Al} alloys and polymer matrix carbon fiber composites (PMCs) are prime candidates for the parts of the structure that experience aerodynamic loads and where aerodynamic heating does not exceed about 125 °Celsius. One class of advanced Al alloys is the lithium (Li)-bearing alloys, such as Al alloy 2090. This alloy contains enough Li to reduce its density by 8

Where this file fits in the PURSUE archive

This file is one of DoD's 282 files in the Trump PURSUE disclosure. Within the DoD agency block it ranks #236 of 282 by Anomalousness Index. Across the entire 478-file archive it ranks #411 of 478.

That places it in the lower-scoring band of the archive (411 of 478 by score), typical of investigative-record style files where the report is paper-based rather than instrumented.

Anomalousness Index: 53/100

This is a reference document, not an encounter report, so the index has no encounter to measure here. The value above is the rubric's default for a document that describes no event, shown so every file in the archive can be ranked the same way. Not a probability of extraterrestrial origin - that number is not honestly computable from the released files and this tracker refuses to publish it.

🤖 AI-ASSISTED SCORING · methodology

The six rubric components break down for this file as follows. Each component has a weighted contribution to the final score; the per-component explanation below describes what this file's particular value on that component means in the rubric's framework.

sensor quality (eyewitness only) 30 × 0.25 = 7.5

This file is a reference document, not an observation, so no sensor, camera, or witness captured anything. The rubric's sensor axis has no not-applicable option, so a document with no instrument record sits on its lowest tier by default.

witness credibility (military personnel) 80 × 0.2 = 16.0

There is no witness: this is a document released by the Department of War, not a first-hand account. The rubric assigns this axis from the originating body, so the value reflects the source of the record, not anyone's testimony.

corroboration (single witness instrument) 60 × 0.2 = 12.0

Nothing is being corroborated, because the file does not report an event. Like every file in the archive it takes the rubric's single-source default.

kinematic anomaly (no kinematic data) 30 × 0.15 = 4.5

The file describes no object and no motion, so the kinematic axis takes the archive-wide 'no kinematic data' default.

mundane explanation available (weak mundane candidate) 70 × 0.1 = 7.0

Every file in the archive scores this tier. For a document that describes no event it carries no information about the record at all.

official disposition (unresolved no review) 60 × 0.1 = 6.0

The rubric's default for the file's release status (files released with redactions are catalogued as unresolved, unredacted ones as open). For a document that reports no event this describes how the file was released, not anything that happened.

Bottom line on the score: the 53/100 is the rubric's default for a document that reports no encounter, so it is not a finding about any event and should not be compared with the scores of sighting reports. For the full per-axis weights and the rubric JSON, see /methodology.

Related files in DoD

Other PURSUE files in the same category, ranked by Anomalousness Index.

DoD · VIDEO SCORE 68

DOW-UAP-PR024, Unresolved UAP Report, Middle East, 2023

DoD · VIDEO SCORE 68

DOW-UAP-PR072, "ADMINISTRATIVE REVISION: IIR 1777 J0032 22 Kazakhstan - UAP in the vicinit…

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DOW-UAP-PR106, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2020

DoD · VIDEO SCORE 68

DOW-UAP-PR108, Unresolved UAP Report, Western United States, 2020

DoD · VIDEO SCORE 68

DOW-UAP-PR109, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2015

DoD · VIDEO SCORE 68

DOW-UAP-PR110, Unresolved UAP Report, Eastern United States, 2020

BROWSE ALL 478 FILES →

Verification

SHA-256:

1a3c2675997f3b701e14c623b33b2741c3d8764f52fd9309e1928a85e11e8ac0

This hash is the SHA-256 of the file body war.gov served on the verification date above. War.gov has re-processed some file bodies since first release (re-compression + OCR, no content removed - see /changes); we re-verify and record the change rather than silently serve a stale hash. How to check this yourself →

Source: https://www.war.gov/medialink/ufo/sept-18/release-06/assets/DOW-UAP-D120_AAWSAP-DIRD-Materials-for-Advanced-Aerospace-Platforms-January-12-2010.pdf

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